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I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have struggled for nearly fifty years to maintain a
retroactivity doctrine, which allows meaningful relief for those who
deserve it without flooding the court system with petitions from
1
cases long since closed. In Roman Nose v. State, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that it will not retroactively
apply the rule prohibiting mandatory life without possibility of
2
release for juveniles (LWOR). The majority held that the rule does
not fall into either of the two exceptions allowing retroactive
3
application of rules of criminal procedure.
This case note first reviews the history of the retroactivity
doctrine and the United States Supreme Court’s decision
4
prohibiting mandatory LWOR for juveniles. It then discusses the
facts and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of the Roman
5
Nose decision. Next, it argues that the majority was wrong to
reaffirm the analysis used in deciding whether a rule applies
6
retroactively because the analysis creates disparate results. Finally,
it concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have
adopted a clear retroactivity doctrine and applied it to the
7
prohibition against mandatory LWOR retroactively.

1.
2.
2014).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271–75 (2008).
Roman Nose v. State (Roman Nose II), 845 N.W.2d 193, 198–201 (Minn.
Id. at 199–200.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A–B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV–V .
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II. HISTORY OF THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
A.

Origins of the Retroactivity Doctrine

Limiting the retroactive application of new court rules is a
8
relatively recent phenomenon. In his commentaries, William
Blackstone explained that it is not the responsibility of the court
“‘to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old
9
one.’” In this vein of reasoning, a judge does not create law, but
10
rather he or she is its “discoverer.” As far back as 1801 the
Supreme Court has adhered to this doctrine, evidenced by an
opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall concerning the
11
retroactivity of a treaty between the United States and France. In
that opinion Marshall ruled, “unconstitutional action ‘confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it has
12
never been passed.’” Over 164 years of jurisprudence reaffirmed
13
this broad view of retroactivity.
In the 1965 case of Linkletter v. Walker, the Supreme Court of
the United States, for the first time, imposed a limit on the
14
retroactivity of new rules. The Court progressively applied the Bill
15
of Rights to the states, and as more of these rights applied to the
8. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.6 (1965) (“‘I know of no
authority in this court to say that in general state decisions shall make law only for
the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand
years.’” (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting))).
9. Id. at 622–23 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
10. Id. at 623 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
222 (1st ed. 1909)).
11. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801) (involving
captured naval ships). But see Brief for Respondents at 4, Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618
(No. 95) (arguing that Schooner Peggy embodies the view that a new rule applies to
cases pending on direct review, but not necessarily on collateral review, because
the treaty did not apply to ships on which seizure was final).
12. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 (quoting Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425,
442 (1886)).
13. See, e.g., Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 369–70; Norton, 118 U.S. at 442.
14. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273 (2008); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at
629; see also Ann N. Bosse, Retroactivity and the Supreme Court, 41 MD. B.J. 30, 30
(2008) (providing a brief overview of Supreme Court cases addressing the
retroactivity doctrine).
15. See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 272. See generally, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 12

2015]

ROMAN NOSE V. STATE

333

states, federal courts became increasingly overwhelmed with
16
petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Linkletter determined that not
17
all rules apply retroactively and denied the retroactive use of the
18
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.
According to Linkletter, cases pending on direct review receive
the benefit of a change in law, but no such bright line exists for
19
prior judgments based on subsequently invalidated rules. After
deciding it was neither required to nor prohibited from making
rules retroactive, the Court devised certain considerations to
determine whether a rule applies retroactively, including the
20
purpose of the rule. However, the years subsequent to Linkletter’s
21
new restriction resulted in unpredictable decisions. To curb the
erratic results, the Court felt the need to further expand the
retroactivity analysis to include not just “convictions now final . . .

368, 408 (1964) (applying a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to not be
compelled as a witness against him or herself to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the
states).
16. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 272 (“The serial incorporation of the Amendments
in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s and 1960’s imposed more constitutional
obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals
were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the
Constitution.”).
17. Id. at 273 (“[T]he retroactive effect of each new rule should be
determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .” (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629)); see also
Bosse, supra note 14, at 30–31.
18. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639–40. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1963) (applying the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the states); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (determining that the exclusionary rule
emanates from the Fourth Amendment).
19. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627, 629 (“[W]e believe that the Constitution
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. . . . We think the Federal
Constitution has no voice upon the subject.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
20. See id. at 636 (relying on three considerations: (1) the purpose of the new
rule, (2) the reliance placed on the invalidated rule, and (3) the effect on the
administration of justice if the new rule applied retroactively).
21. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 273–74. For example, the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination was applied to a defendant on direct review
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966), but was held not to apply to
another defendant on direct review using the Linkletter standard. Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733–35 (1966).
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[but] convictions at various stages of trial and direct review” as
22
23
well. This was adopted as the “Linkletter-Stovall” approach.
B.

The Teague Analysis

In 1989 the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane
took it upon itself to again redefine retroactivity and narrow its
24
The Court was no longer concerned with the
scope.
25
considerations used in Linkletter. Instead, the analysis shifted to
26
whether the rule announced was substantive or procedural. The
Court held that new rules generally do not apply retroactively after
27
direct review concludes. However, two exceptions to this rule
28
29
exist. First, a new rule applies retroactively if it is substantive law.
Second, a new rule applies retroactively, despite being procedural,
if it is a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” implicating the
30
fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings.
Rules of substance apply retroactively because “they
‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
22. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967).
23. See generally Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009)
(“Under the so-called Linkletter-Stovall test, we decided whether to give retroactive
effect to a particular decision based on (1) the purpose of the decision, (2)
reliance on the prior rule of law, and (3) the effect upon the administration of
justice of granting retroactive effect.”).
24. 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)
25. See id. at 301 (“[The] retroactivity determination would normally entail
application of the Linkletter standard, but we believe that our approach to
retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification.”).
26. Id. at 307 (adopting previous dissents and concurrences of Justice
Harlan).
27. New rules of criminal procedural generally apply to cases on “direct
review or not yet final.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–10; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
28. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–10. It should be noted the preliminary burden in
the analysis is to determine whether the rule being discussed is a new rule. See id.
at 301.
29. Id. at 307 (“‘[A] new rule should be applied retroactively if it places
certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))). It wasn’t until 2004 that the Court explicitly explained
that this exception applied to “substantive rules”; the explanation seems only to be
a semantic shift. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
30. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13; see also Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311,
323 (Minn. 2013).
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convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a
31
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” On the other
hand, procedural rules do not apply retroactively because “[t]hey
do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law
does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might
32
have been acquitted otherwise.” To Justice Scalia, this is a “more
speculative connection to innocence” warranting retroactivity in “a
small set of ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the
33
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings.’”
C.

Minnesota’s Application of Teague

Minnesota applied the Linkletter-Stovall test to determine
34
retroactivity until 2004, when it finally adopted the Teague
35
analysis. In adopting Teague fifteen years after the Supreme Court
decided it, the Minnesota Supreme Court believed that it was
36
bound to its application. The Minnesota Supreme Court trusted
37
that while it was able to determine the retroactivity of state law, it
was mandated to “follow the lead of the Supreme Court” when
called upon to decide the retroactivity of a federal rule of
38
constitutional criminal procedure.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed
Minnesota’s decision and declared that Teague is not binding on

31. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
620 (1998)).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 484 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
34. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (basing
retroactivity on (1) the purpose of the decision, (2) reliance on the prior rule of
law, and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice of granting retroactive
effect).
35. O’Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2004) (holding that in the
context of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, the court is “compelled
to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in determining when a decision is to be
afforded retroactive treatment”).
36. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it was “not free to fashion
[its] own standard of retroactivity.” Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Minn.
2006).
37. See O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 338 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496
U.S. 167, 177 (1990)).
38. Id. at 339.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/12

6

Mazurek: Criminal Law: No Looking Back: Narrowing the Scope of the Retroac

336

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

39

the states. Nevertheless, Minnesota continues to apply it
40
voluntarily. Minnesota has reaffirmed its voluntary choice to apply
Teague three times, and each time it has declined to decide in favor
41
of retroactivity.
D.

Mandatory Life Without Release for Juveniles
1.

The Founding Principle of the Juvenile Court: Rehabilitation

The central focus of this article is the retroactivity doctrine and
whether it should be applied to juveniles who were sentenced to
42
mandatory LWOR. In order to adequately discuss this issue,
however, this case note must briefly touch on the founding
43
principle of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. The
juvenile system is first focused on rehabilitating juveniles, whereas
the adult system is focused primarily on punishment and
44
deterrence. The call for a distinct system to address the unique
needs of juveniles who commit crimes originally fueled the creation
45
of the first juvenile court.

39. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275 (2008) (pointing out that
Teague and its progeny spoke in terms of federal habeas corpus remedies, so the
states are not bound by Teague).
40. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009) (“We elect to
retain Teague.”).
41. See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Minn. 2014); Chambers v. State,
831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013); Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 499 (Minn.
2012) (reviewing the retroactivity of a new rule holding that the Sixth Amendment
is violated where a defendant is not informed about the deportation consequences
of a guilty plea).
42. See infra Part IV.
43. This is despite the availability of previous, well-formed articles published
by the William Mitchell Law Review involving juveniles and the criminal justice
system. See, e.g., Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile
Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
883, 889–93 (2006) (describing the origin and founding principles of the juvenile
court in the United States and Minnesota); see also Nic Puechner, Note, No Clean
Slates: Unpacking the Complications of Juvenile Expungements in the Wake of In re
Welfare of J.J.P., 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1158, 1162–66 (2014) (advocating for
reform to Minnesota’s juvenile expungement statute).
44. See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 890–92.
45. See id. at 889. The first juvenile court was created in 1899 in Chicago. Id.
at 889. Prior to then, children fourteen and older were treated as adults. Sean
Craig, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road
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46

Courts maintain a parens patriae role in guiding a juvenile
47
back to law-abiding behavior. Historically, the juvenile court was
meant to remove the harsh consequences attributed to the adult
48
criminal system. The belief was that capital punishment and
lengthy prison sentences have no deterrent effect on children, so
49
they are repugnant. Since the juvenile system was not focused on
punishing children, but rather on rehabilitation, it was believed
that juveniles did not need the same constitutional protections as
50
adult defendants. Although created with the best intentions, this
paternalistic approach to delinquent children led to a deprivation
51
of fundamental rights.
The application of parens patriae slowly gave way to stricter
52
consequences mirroring adult sentences.
These stricter
consequences led the United States Supreme Court, in the 1960s,
to hold for the first time that juvenile delinquency does, in fact,
involve a substantial loss of freedoms that must be constitutionally

Towards a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 382 (2013). Before turning
fourteen, juveniles maintained a rebuttable presumption that they were not
criminally liable for their actions. Id. at 382.
46. Parens Patriae is a doctrine in which the state provides protection for
those unable to care for themselves and literally means “parent of his or her
country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014).
47. See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 914.
48. See id. at 890. Juvenile matters are civil, not criminal. Id. at 894. Further,
the terminology is different in juvenile court, creating a façade that juvenile
proceedings are different from criminal proceedings. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 6.08
(juveniles are respondents); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.04 (juveniles receive a
disposition hearing); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05 (juveniles are adjudicated
delinquent); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.1 (not defendants); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.01 (not
convicted of crimes); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03 (not a sentencing hearing).
49. Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 891 (citing MONRAD G. PAULSEN &
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed.,
1974)).
50. Id. at 902.
51. Id. at 903–04.
52. Id. at 893–94 (“Many people characterized [the court’s treatment of
juveniles] as punitive and indistinguishable from criminal dispositions.”); see, e.g.,
In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. 1998) (“The juvenile court’s
dispositions must be rehabilitative and tied to the needs of and opportunities for
the child, . . . but these laws do not prohibit ‘a rational, punitive disposition, one
where the record shows that correction or rehabilitation of the child reasonably
cannot be achieved without a penalty.’” (quoting In re Welfare of C.A.W., 579
N.W.2d 494, 497 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998))).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/12

8

Mazurek: Criminal Law: No Looking Back: Narrowing the Scope of the Retroac

338

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

53

protected. Specifically, one year later the Supreme Court held in
In re Gault that the right to the notice of charges, the right to
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to
confrontation, and the right to appellate review all apply to juvenile
54
delinquency proceedings. The Court was hesitant to do away with
any distinction between the adult and juvenile system—maintaining
the semblance of parens patriae, so not all of the rights afforded to
55
adult defendants are yet available to juveniles. However, the line
between the adult and juvenile system is blurred, and in Minnesota,
the harshest adult consequences are available to use against
56
juveniles.
2.

The Heinous Crimes Statute and Juveniles Tried as Adults

Juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment in Minnesota were
57
not always sentenced to die in prison. But two separate systems
collided, resulting in harsher mandatory sentences for juveniles in
adult court without the consideration of the juvenile’s age: (1) the
creation and expansion of the heinous crimes statute, and (2) the
58
expansion of the court’s ability to try juveniles as adults.
In the 1980s and early 1990s Minnesota, and much of the
country, was transformed by a tough-on-crime approach to criminal
59
justice. Minnesota created mandatory life imprisonment sentences
53. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to delinquency proceedings
in a case involving a juvenile being removed to adult court by waiver).
54. 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 47, 57–58 (1967).
55. See id. at 30.
We do not mean [by this] to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of
the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Id. (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See infra note 67.
57. Prior to the adoption of stricter sentences, an adult life sentence had the
possibility of parole after a minimum of thirty years. See State v. Mitchell, 577
N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1998).
58. Id. at 488–90 (giving a brief overview of the heinous crime statute’s
adoption in Minnesota and the broadening of the extended juvenile jurisdiction
(EJJ) and certification processes).
59. See id.; Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW &
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60

for “heinous” crimes. The heinous crimes statute signed into law
in 1998 does not make a distinction between adult and juvenile
61
offenders. Further, since the statute’s inception, the legislature
has twice sharpened its teeth. First, the legislature expanded the list
62
of heinous crimes requiring a mandatory life sentence. Second, it
63
took away the possibility of parole for certain life sentences.
The juvenile system was not shielded from the national shift to
64
more severe punitive policies. The drive to make juvenile court
increasingly punitive was fueled by an increase in youth violence
65
and a rhetorical fear of a “young generation of super-predators.”
As a result, an estimated 200,000 juveniles are tried as adults each
66
year in the United States. Following this nationwide trend,
Minnesota advanced its own policies to allow courts to prosecute
67
more juveniles as adults.
INEQ. 263, 266–67 (2013).
60. Act effective Aug. 1, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, § 3, 1998 Minn. Laws 667, 727
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.106 (2012)) (defining heinous crimes as first
through third degree murder, first degree assault, and first through third degree
criminal sexual conduct committed with “force or violence”).
61. See MINN. STAT. § 609.106. But see State v. Ali, Nos. A12-0173, A13-0996,
2014 WL 5012773, at *13 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the heinous crimes
statute can no longer be mandatorily applied to juveniles after the decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)).
62. See Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 401, art. 1, § 13, 2002 Minn. Laws 1673, 1681
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.106) (including felony murder in
furtherance of an act of terrorism to include a mandatory life sentence); Act of
June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 2, § 5, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1127 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 609.106) (including premeditated murder to require a mandatory
life sentence).
63. Compare MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 4 (mandating that parole is not
available for heinous crimes), with Act of Apr. 4, 1978, ch. 723, art. 1, § 5, 1978
Minn. Laws 761, 764 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 4 (1978)) (creating
the possibility of parole after seventeen years for a mandatory life sentence).
64. Feld, supra note 59, at 265–67 (advocating for a “youth discount” to
formally mitigate all sentences imposed on juveniles).
65. Id. at 266–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 265.
67. See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488–90 (Minn. 1998). First, in 1994
the Minnesota legislature implemented extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). Id. at
489; see MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1994), repealed by Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art.
4, § 3, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 692 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.130
(1999)). EJJ is a designation allowing juvenile courts to retain jurisdiction over a
juvenile until he or she reaches twenty-one years old by imposing both an adult
and juvenile sentence, while staying the adult portion of the sentence. MINN. STAT.
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Prohibiting Mandatory LWOR for Juveniles

As it did in In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court took
68
steps to combat the harsher punishments used on juveniles. It did
this through the lens of the Eighth Amendment’s protection
69
against “cruel and unusual punishment.”
First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court reopened a discussion
70
foreclosed sixteen years earlier,
holding that the Eighth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the
71
imposition of the death penalty on any juvenile. In 2005, Justice
Kennedy recognized in his majority opinion that the Court’s
current understanding of what is “cruel and unusual” is based on
“‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
72
maturing society.’” Second, in 2010 the Court expanded its Eighth
73
Amendment protection for juveniles in Graham v. Florida. In
Graham the Court prohibited states from imposing LWOR on
74
juveniles for non-homicide crimes. A common theme between
§ 260B.130, subdiv. 4 (2012). The legislature implemented EJJ “in part because of
the perception that juvenile court dispositions were often too lenient while the adult
court sentences were often too harsh when applied to children.” Mitchell, 577
N.W.2d at 489 (emphasis added). Second, the legislature also expanded juvenile
certification in 1994, allowing fifteen-year-olds—now fourteen-year-olds—to be
certified to adult court after showing that retaining the child in juvenile court
would not serve public safety. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subdiv. 2(6)(ii)
(1994)). Minnesota’s adult certification statute is now codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.125 (2012).
68. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
69. See id.
70. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989) (rejecting the
claim that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to use capital punishment
on children over fifteen, but under eighteen, because there was not a national
consensus to label it cruel and unusual), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
71. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (“When a juvenile offender commits a
heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties,
but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature
understanding of his own humanity.”). The Court had also held prior to Roper that
it was cruel and unusual to apply the death sentence to criminals with intellectual
disabilities and juveniles fifteen and younger. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (intellectual disabilities); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838
(1988) (juveniles under sixteen).
72. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01
(1958)).
73. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
74. Id. at 82. The court further explained that a state is not required to give
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these cases is that the harshest juvenile consequences do not have
75
the same deterrent effect as when applied to adult defendants.
Expounding on the new line of precedent creating special
considerations for juveniles, the Court again reexamined a juvenile
76
sentencing scheme in 2012. In an opinion authored by Justice
Kagan, the Supreme Court, in its combined decision of Miller v.
77
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, held that sentencing a juvenile to
78
mandatory LWOR violates the Eighth Amendment. Although the
Court did not categorically prohibit LWOR for juveniles, it did
79
comment, “[T]his harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”
The Court focused on the fact that Roper and Graham made it clear
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing” based on “their lack of maturity and . . . undeveloped
sense of responsibility,” which leads to “recklessness, impulsivity,
80
and heedless risk-taking.” Justice Kagan explained that before a
juvenile can be sentenced to LWOR, the court must consider the
juvenile’s individual characteristics, including maturity and family
81
environment.

freedom to a juvenile offender, but rather to “give defendants . . . some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.” Id. at 75.
75. See id. (“Deterrence does not suffice to justify the sentence . . . .”); Roper,
543 U.S. at 572 (“[N]either retribution nor deterrence provides adequate
justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders . . . .”).
76. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
77. Id. at 2461–62 (decided on collateral review); see also Jackson v. State, 194
S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011), rev’d, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.
78. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (holding that the sentencing court must
consider the individual characteristics of the juvenile before imposing LWOR).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2464 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 2468. However, the Court failed to explain all of the factors to be
considered and how each affects the sentence. See id.; see also State v. Ali, Nos. A120173, A13-0996, 2014 WL 5012773, at *17 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2014) (remanding the
case back to the district court to follow the basic factors outlined in Miller to
determine whether the defendant may be sentenced to LWOR for an offense
committed as a juvenile).
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Retroactive Application of Miller

The Court did not address whether the rule applies
82
83
retroactively, so states have taken it upon themselves to decide.
In November 2012 Michigan was the first state court to address the
84
retroactivity of Miller. This court held that it does not apply
85
retroactively. Less than fifteen days later Illinois responded with
its own decision holding that Miller does apply retroactively—
86
foreshadowing the divide between jurisdictions.
In 2013 the Minnesota Supreme Court in Chambers v. State also
87
held that Miller does not apply retroactively. It decided that while
Miller is a new rule, it is “neither substantive nor a watershed
88
[procedural] rule.” Justice Dietzen emphasized the need for
“finality and providing a bright-line rule,” and that “[w]ithout
89
finality, the criminal law is deprived much of its deterrent effect.”
III. THE ROMAN NOSE DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

On June 16, 2001, Tony Allen Roman Nose was found guilty
on two counts: (1) first-degree murder while committing or
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct, and (2) first-degree
90
premeditated murder. On July 11, 2000, Jolene Stuedemann was
found dead in her home; she was beaten, sexually assaulted, and

82. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
83. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114–17 (Iowa 2013) (holding
that Miller is retroactive after using the Teague analysis).
84. People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 708–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 496
Mich. 440 (2014).
85. Id.
86. People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1021–22 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012).
87. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330–31 (Minn. 2013).
88. Id. at 331 (relying on the following facts: (1) Miller does not eliminate the
power of the state to impose LWOR, (2) certain federal decisions held that Miller
is procedural, and (3) Miller does not announce a new element of the offense).
89. Id. at 323–24.
90. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn. 2014).
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91

stabbed repeatedly with a screwdriver. She was seventeen years
92
old.
Roman Nose was living in a group home during that time, and
on the night of the murder he left without permission to visit his
93
friend, Andy Reiman, who was dating the victim. The three drank
94
beer and watched television at Reiman’s home. Although there
was conflicting testimony about the events that took place that
95
night, it appears that Roman Nose left Reiman’s home around
96
4:00 a.m. The victim left Reiman’s home and returned to her own
97
before Roman Nose left that evening.
The next morning Roman Nose returned to the group home,
98
and staff contacted the police to alert them about his return. An
officer questioned Roman Nose about his absence from the home
and then subsequently responded to a call resulting in the
99
discovery of the victim’s body. The investigators discovered a
crumpled newspaper in the victim’s mouth, a bloodstained
screwdriver near the victim’s body, a bathroom towel with blood on
100
it, and part of a set of headphones under the victim’s body.
Investigators found the other half of the headphones and various
bloodstained clothing belonging to Roman Nose concealed in a
101
trash bag in a garbage can at the group home. The police also
found Roman Nose’s underwear in his bedroom at the group home
102
containing a mixture of semen and a bloodstain.
A forensic scientist performed DNA testing on the newspaper,
screwdriver, and bathroom towel, and fingerprint analysis was
91. State v. Roman Nose (Roman Nose I), 667 N.W.2d 386, 389–90 (Minn.
2003).
92. Id. at 389.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Roman Nose testified that he was sitting on the couch, he saw Reiman
and Stuedemann having sex, and then he had consensual sex with Stuedemann
while Reiman slept. Id. Reiman testified that after Reiman and Stuedemann had
sex, he did not fall asleep right away, and Stuedemann did not have sex with
Roman Nose while he was there. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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103

performed on the newspaper. Vaginal swabs revealed a positive
104
match for Roman Nose’s DNA. The blood on Roman Nose’s
jeans and jersey matched the victim’s DNA, and a fingerprint found
on the newspaper stuffed in the victim’s mouth matched Roman
105
Nose’s left middle finger.
Roman Nose was seventeen years and ten months old at the
106
time of the murder, and he was mandatorily sentenced to LWOR.
On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction
107
but did not address his sentence because he did not challenge it.
Instead, Roman Nose challenged various aspects of the DNA
108
evidence used in his conviction, and he claimed the prosecutor
109
engaged in misconduct during closing arguments.
Three months after the Miller decision, but prior to the
Chambers decision, Roman Nose petitioned the district court on
110
collateral review, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth
111
Amendment. Roman Nose sought to be resentenced to life with
112
the possibility of release. Roman Nose sought collateral review
113
almost nine years after his original sentence.
Generally,
postconviction petitions must be filed within two years of an
114
appellate court’s disposition on direct appeal, but exceptions
115
exist. Relevant to this case, a postconviction petition is not time

103. Id.
104. Id. at 391.
105. Id. at 390.
106. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Minn. 2014). See generally MINN.
STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2(1) (2012).
107. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196; accord Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d 386.
108. Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d at 391–92 (objecting to the admissibility of the
DNA because it was new type of DNA testing).
109. Id. at 400–04 (claiming that the prosecutor misrepresented the DNA
evidence, the fingerprint analysis, and the blood on the shirt, and made improper
arguments based on character evidence).
110. See generally Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1285 (2011) (defining for the
first time collateral review of a judgment to “mean[] a judicial reexamination of a
judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process”).
111. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
112. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
113. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196.
114. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(a) (2012).
115. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196; see MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv.
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barred if “the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal . . .
law by . . . the United States Supreme Court . . . and the petitioner
establishes that this interpretation is retroactively applicable to the
116
petitioner’s case.”
The district court granted Roman Nose’s petition and
117
resentenced him without a Miller hearing
to life “with the
118
possibility of release after thirty years.” The district court first
held that Roman Nose’s appeal was not time barred because
Roman Nose asserted a new interpretation of federal constitutional
119
law by the United States Supreme Court.
The court then
elaborated by adding that Miller “made a substantial change in
federal law that does, indeed, break new ground, and was not
dictated by precedent at the time Petitioner’s conviction
120
121
occurred,” so it applied retroactively.
The district court struggled in deciding how to resentence
Roman Nose, noting that he was almost thirty and it would be
difficult “[to] envision[] Petitioner as a juvenile, and [to] apply[]
appropriate consideration to his age, life history, home
122
environment, and other circumstances.” The court ultimately
concluded that it was “left with no alternative but to resentence
Petitioner to life with the possibility of release after thirty (30)
123
years.”
124
The state appealed the decision on March 18, 2013. The
Minnesota Supreme Court stayed the appeal until it announced the
Chambers decision, where it held that Miller does not apply
4(b)(3).
116. MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(b)(3).
117. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (allowing for courts to hold a hearing to
make specific findings about the individual characteristics of the juveniles before
sentencing them to LWOR).
118. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197.
119. Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, add. at 4, Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d
193 (No. A13-0483).
120. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202.
121. Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, add. at 9 (finding that
Miller “made a substantial change in federal law that does, indeed, break new
ground, and was not dictated by precedent at the time [Roman Nose’s] conviction
occurred” and that “Miller also created a watershed rule of criminal procedure”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id.
124. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197.
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125

retroactively. On June 28, 2013, the Supreme Court lifted the stay
126
in Roman Nose’s case.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Decision
127

Roman Nose challenged his sentence for three reasons. This
case note, however, is focused on Roman Nose’s argument that the
court wrongly decided Chambers and that Miller applies
128
retroactively. Roman Nose also argued that the retroactivity issue
was moot because Chambers decided the issue already, so there was
129
nothing to resolve. He thirdly argued that the court should use its
130
supervisory power to grant him extraordinary relief in this unique
131
132
circumstance. The court held in favor of the State on all issues.
Ultimately, the court reversed his sentence and reinstated his
133
original sentence of LWOR.
The majority initially noted the importance of stare decisis in
that the court only overrules precedent for a “compelling
134
reason.” The court then disposed of Roman Nose’s retroactivity
135
argument in three ways. First, the court was unmoved by the fact
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota
136
conceded that Miller applies retroactively. Second, the court was
not persuaded by the fact that Miller applied retroactively to its
137
which was pending on
companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,

125. Id. See generally Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013). Decided
on May 31, 2013, Chambers addressed the retroactivity of Miller for the first time in
Minnesota. Id.
126. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197.
127. Id.
128. See Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, at 16–23.
129. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197–98.
130. Id. at 201. Supervisory powers allow the court to grant relief to ensure the
fair administration of justice. Id.
131. Id. at 201–02.
132. Id. at 198–201.
133. Id. at 202.
134. Id. at 198 (citing State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) and
State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)).
135. Id. at 198–200.
136. Id. at 198–99 (explaining that it was aware of the U.S. attorney’s position
prior to deciding Chambers).
137. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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138

collateral review in state court. Finally, the court rejected Roman
Nose’s argument that Chambers is flawed because Miller is both a
139
substantive and a watershed procedural rule.
Roman Nose
contended that Miller is substantive because it “prohibit[s] the
mandatory imposition” of LWOR, and that it is procedural because
it requires the sentencing court to contemplate specific factors
140
before sentencing a juvenile to a non-mandatory LWOR sentence.
The majority reiterated its holdings in Chambers, under a Teague
141
analysis, and concluded that Miller is a procedural rule. After
reaffirming Chambers, the court held that the district court erred
when it concluded that Roman Nose’s petition was not time
142
barred.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court was wrong to reaffirm its
choice to follow Teague and to determine that Miller is not
143
retroactive. Teague is not binding on the states, and states may
144
choose to abandon it. The United States Supreme Court created
the Teague analysis to answer questions of retroactivity involving
145
federal petitions for habeas corpus.
Some states abandoned

138. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199 (citing Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d
480, 494–95 (Minn. 2012) (refusing to apply a rule retroactively based solely on
the procedural posture of a case at the Supreme Court)). See generally Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2468–69 (granting relief in both Miller and Jackson v. Hobbs).
139. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199–200.
140. Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, at 20 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
141. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199–200.
142. Id. at 200–01. Because Miller did not apply retroactively, the time barring
exceptions of MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(a)(b)(3) (2012) also did not apply.
Id.
143. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 204–05 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing
Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 342–44 (Minn. 2013) (Page, J., dissenting)).
144. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278–79 (2008) (“Since Teague is
based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal
statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts.”).
145. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 293, 316 (1989) (reviewing the retroactive
application of a new criminal procedure rule on “a petition for a writ of habeas
petition corpus” in federal court).
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146

Teague in favor of a modified analysis or the Linkletter-Stovall
147
148
approach. But, most states still choose to apply Teague.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted various critiques about
149
Teague when it originally adopted it. However, it overlooked these
shortcomings in favor of the policy interest of “finality” in
150
sentencing. That being said, this concern is basically irrelevant
here because there are only eight juveniles sentenced to LWOR in
151
Minnesota. Further, the Minnesota court believed that Teague
drew a bright line and avoided the pitfall of the modified Linkletter
152
approach—that it did not create uniform results.
Similarly,
Minnesota rejected Nevada’s modified version of Teague because it
153
feared it also lacked uniform results.
A.

Teague Produces Disparate Results

The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to recognize that Teague
154
does not create uniform results either. Teague works under the
assumption that all rules fall into a dichotomy of being either
155
substantive or procedural. When a rule is strictly substantive or
156
procedural, Teague produces adequate results. However, the line
146. E.g., Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002).
147. See, e.g., State v. Whitefield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266–68 (Mo. 2003); Cowell v.
Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517–518 (S.D. 1990).
148. See, e.g., State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003); Windom v. State,
886 So. 2d 915, 939 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J., concurring); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d
613, 619 (Ga. 2003); Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 67 (Idaho 2010); Danforth v.
State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009).
149. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 497 (acknowledging the criticism that Teague is
“too narrow or strict, or out of place where a state court is reviewing its own
convictions”).
150. See id. (noting that states adopted Teague “on the important policy
interest in finality”).
151. Abby Simons, Eight Young Killers at Core of Life-Sentence Debate, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Mar. 28, 2014, at 1B, available at LEXIS.
152. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 499.
153. Id.
154. See id.; see also infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (listing the cases
finding Miller substantive and the cases finding it procedural).
155. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 202 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J.,
concurring) (“But Teague does not address what should be done with rules that do
not fit neatly into either of these boxes.”).
156. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993) (concluding that a
new rule about jury instructions was procedural).
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between a substantive rule and a procedural rule is not always
157
clear. The Teague analysis does not have a solution for newly
announced rules exhibiting both substantive and procedural
158
characteristics. This problem exists with Miller since it exhibits
159
160
characteristics of both a substantive rule and a procedural rule.
Minnesota definitively declared that Miller is not substantive
161
and does not apply retroactively, but fifteen other states have had
162
different interpretations of the Miller decision. Some held that
163
Miller is substantive and applies retroactively, while other states
164
The first courts to address Miller’s
held that it does not.
retroactivity, like Minnesota, failed to recognize that the rule has
165
both substantive and procedural elements. The most recent Miller
157. See United States v. Tayman, 885 F. Supp. 832, 841 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(“[T]he line separating procedure and substance is not always a bright one . . . .”
(citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973) (“We would not suggest that the
distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy
classification of cases in one category or the other.”))).
158. See generally Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (failing to address
instances where a rule is both substantive and procedureal); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989) (failing to address instances where a rule is both substantive and
procedureal).
159. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202–03 (explaining that Miller is substantive
because it (1) prohibits mandatory LWOR for juveniles, which basically prohibits a
class of punishment available to the state; and (2) potentially introduces a new
element into sentencing structure, which modifies the elements of an offense).
160. Id. at 203 (arguing that Miller is procedural because it (1) only adds one
step to the consideration of LWOR; and (2) does not entirely prohibit LWOR for
juveniles).
161. Id. (majority opinion).
162. Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral
Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 192 (2014).
163. E.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703
(Miss. 2013).
164. E.g., Williams v. State, No. CR-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828, at *12 (Ala.
Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d
685, 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, No. 146478, 2014 WL 3174626 (Mich. July 8,
2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 327–30 (Minn. 2013); Commonwealth
v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 2013).
165. See Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022 (“[W]e find that Miller constitutes a new
substantive rule.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“It is simply the manner and factors
to be considered in the imposition of that particular sentence that Miller dictates,
rendering the ruling procedural and not substantive in nature.”).
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retroactivity decisions, however, discern the duality of the rule. If
a court chooses to paint Miller as substantive, it refers to the rule as
“categorically bann[ing] a punishment that the law cannot impose
167
upon juveniles, a mandatory life without parole sentence.” While
a court interpreting Miller to be procedural concludes that Miller
did not “eliminate the power of the State to impose” LWOR, it only
168
requires the “sentencer [to] follow a certain process.”
Minnesota adopted Teague to draw a bright line and create
169
uniform results, but it instead creates arbitrary results in this
170
case. The divide in the retroactive application of Miller creates
171
disparate results for juveniles sentenced to LWOR. A juvenile will
be entitled to a Miller hearing based solely on where the offense was
172
committed—not on the individual determination of the juvenile.
Further, the Minnesota branch of the Department of Justice
173
conceded that Miller applies retroactively. Juveniles within the
state of Minnesota will have disparate treatment depending on
174
whether the state or federal government prosecutes them.

166.
2014).

Songster v. Beard, No. 04-5916, 2014 WL 3731459, at *3 (D. Pa. July 29,

The Miller rule has both substantive and procedural elements.
Substantively, it bans mandatory life without parole sentences for
juvenile homicide defendants. Procedurally, it mandates a minimal
process for sentencing those in that class of defendants. The former is
a new substantive rule of criminal law. The latter is an implementation
of the substantive rule.
Id.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009).
170. Compare Williams v. State, No. Cr-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828, at *12
(Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014) (holding that Miller does not apply retroactively),
with Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1021–22 (holding that Miller applies retroactively).
171. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J.,
concurring) (explaining that juveniles will receive “significant disparity in
outcome” influenced “only by the date of the offense or by the state of
residence”).
172. Id.
173. See Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The
government here has conceded that Miller is retroactive . . . .”); see also Flowers v.
Roy, No. 13-1508, 2014 WL 1757898, at *6 (D. Minn. May 1, 2014).
174. See Flowers, 2014 WL 1757898, at *9 (granting a writ of habeas corpus).
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Uniform results are important so that similarly situated
defendants do not receive disparate treatment. Essential to
fundamental fairness in our judiciary is the equal treatment for
those accused of crimes; it is why the Equal Protection Clause is
175
imbedded into both the Minnesota and U.S. Constitution.
One of the inherent rights secured to a free people by
[the Minnesota Constitution] is the inherent right to
“equal and impartial laws, which govern the whole
community and each member thereof.” Put another way,
persons similarly situated are to be treated alike unless a
176
sufficient basis exists for distinguishing among them.
Equal treatment of similarly situated defendants is an
177
important value to the people of Minnesota. In fact, in the past,
Minnesota courts chose to apply a state rule retroactively solely
178
based on the equal treatment of similar defendants.
This
principle should carry into the decision of whether to apply Miller
hearings retroactively to the eight Minnesotans serving life for
179
childhood crimes. The uncertainty of the substantive/procedural
analysis does not provide a “sufficient basis” to distinguish those
180
who were previously sentenced to LWOR.

175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Hawes v. 1997 Jeep Wrangler, 602 N.W.2d
874, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“‘Equal protection is an inherent but
unenumerated right found and confirmed in Minnesota’s state constitution.’”
(quoting Lundberg by Lundberg v. Jeep Corp., 582 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998))).
176. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J.,
concurring) (quoting Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225, 14
N.W.2d 400, 405 (1944)).
177. See id.
178. State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting the
application of a civil retroactivity rule and basing retroactivity solely on the
reasoning that “hold[ing] otherwise would be to treat similarly situated criminal
defendants differently”). Minnesota never addressed this case and its weight on
the Chambers or Roman Nose decisions. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193 (Minn.
2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013); Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.
2d 386 (Minn. 2003).
179. Simons, supra note 151.
180. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 893 (citing Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376
N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985)).
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Narrowing the Retroactivity Doctrine

Minnesota’s application of Teague also has a limiting effect on
181
the future of the retroactivity doctrine. The majority labeled the
Miller rule as procedural without discussing Teague’s inadequate
application to rules exhibiting both substantive and procedural
182
characteristics. It is unclear where the line between substantive
183
and procedural rules now lies. Nevertheless, Chambers and Roman
Nose create precedent allowing rules exhibiting both substantive
184
and procedural characteristics to be defaulted as procedural.
Once a rule is labeled procedural, it only applies retroactively
185
if it is considered a watershed procedural rule. A watershed
procedural rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock
186
procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.”
Since the inception of Teague, a rule has yet to be considered a
187
watershed rule. This suggests that even fewer rules will be applied
188
retroactively in Minnesota.
It is not the intention of this note to argue for the broadest
application of retroactivity; there must be limits. However, the
doctrine should not be so limited to exclude the benefit of a Miller
hearing to all juveniles currently serving LWOR. In the case of
sentencing, particularly as applied to juveniles, a narrowed
189
retroactivity doctrine has a negative effect. Even commenters in
181. Compare Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 203 (Anderson, J., concurring),
with Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
182. See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202–03; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 327.
183. See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 203.
184. See id. (agreeing that “[b]ased on the current state of the law . . . the
Miller rule is procedural” after explaining how Miller has both substantive and
procedural characteristics); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 328.
185. See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311–12 (1989) (explaining how
retroactivity is reserved only for watershed rules of criminal procedure).
186. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 200 (citing Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331).
187. 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (3d ed. 2013)
(citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004)).
188. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 502 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (foreseeing the narrowing scope of Teague).
189. See Douglas A. Berman, Re-balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for
Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 153 (2014); Sarah French Russell,
Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79,
126–27 (2012) (“Retroactivity doctrines should not be a bar to relief when a
prisoner seeks to rely on a case . . . that has narrowed the scope of a sentencing
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favor of a narrow retroactivity doctrine recognize that relief should
190
Miller is a special
be given to juveniles in some cases.
circumstance in which the traditional Teague retroactivity doctrine
191
produces the wrong result.
C.

Dollars and Cents
192

Another critique of Miller hearings is that they are too costly
193
and inaccurate, but this view is shortsighted. First, resentencing
hearings will save money systemically by reducing the cost of
194
Juveniles
imprisoning juveniles given reduced sentences.
sentenced to LWOR are likely serving the longest prison sentences
because they enter prison at an earlier age than any other
195
defendant, and they do not have the opportunity for release.
196
Juveniles sentenced to LWOR will grow old and die in prison.
They “add to the rising geriatric prison population and place heavy
197
financial burdens on states.” In the United States the average cost
198
of incarceration is $22,000 annually—$36,836 in Minnesota —and
the sentence can be expected to last at least fifty-five years if the
enhancement provision.”).
190. E.g., Scott, supra note 162, at 226–27.
I earnestly hope that Miller . . . affects all of the more than two
thousand sentences imposed in violation of the rule but which became
final before the decision. As a matter of justice, every juvenile offender
serving a mandatory sentence of life without parole deserves an
opportunity to request resentencing or parole.
Id.
191. See generally Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 200 (refusing to apply Miller
retroactively).
192. E.g., Scott, supra note 162, at 197–202 (arguing that resentencing
hearings are costly “both in time and resources”).
193. E.g., id. at 203–08 (arguing that the rules of evidence do not apply in
resentencing hearings and that too much time has passed since the original
sentencing hearing).
194. Russell, supra note 189, at 150.
195. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 33 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc
/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf.
196. Id. at 1.
197. Id. at 33.
198. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: STATE
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, 3 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf.
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199

juvenile is sentenced in his or her late teens. However, the cost of
care for inmates rises with age, and at age fifty-five the annual
200
average cost of incarceration is closer to $65,000. This yields a
201
lifetime average cost of $2 million per prisoner. Adding the
possibility of parole could substantially reduce the lifetime
202
incarceration cost of a juvenile inmate.
Second, resentencing hearings on direct appeal often take
203
place years after the original sentence, and courts are allowed to
204
consider additional information at resentencing. So, the simple
fact that a juvenile receives a Miller hearing years later does not
necessarily mean the hearing is more expensive or difficult than a
205
direct appeal hearing. Further, resentencing juveniles will not
206
represent “sunk costs” by the court since the juveniles received
207
mandatory sentences. Necessarily, they could not have cost the
court because the court was restricted from making any
208
considerations.
Third, juveniles allowed a Miller hearing are not entitled to a
209
new trial. Courts have noted that resentencing hearings are much
210
less burdensome than new trials. Juveniles sentenced to life are
199.
200.

NELLIS, supra note 195, at 33.
Id. (citing B. JAYE ANNO ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF ELDERLY, CHRONICALLY ILL, AND
TERMINALLY ILL INMATES 9 (2004)).
201. Id.
202. Russell, supra note 189, at 150.
203. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011)
(resentencing taking place five years after direct appeal).
204. Id. at 1236 (holding that district courts may consider post-sentencing
rehabilitation when resentencing defendants).
205. See Russell, supra note 189, at 146–52.
206. A “sunk cost” is “[a] cost that has already been incurred and cannot be
recovered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (10th ed. 2014). In this context, a “sunk
cost” refers to the cost a court spends on making specific findings before
sentencing a juvenile to LWOR.
207. Scott, supra note 162, at 213 (“Those cases also involve few ‘sunk costs’
because by definition the life without parole sentence was mandatory.”).
208. See id.
209. See generally Scott, supra note 162, at 181 (discussing factors that favor
resentencing over retrial).
210. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (reasoning
that sentencing hearings take much less time and are much less costly than new
trials). But see Scott, supra note 162, at 181 (“[R]oughly ninety-five percent of
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas rather than trials.”).
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only entitled to a hearing that takes individualized characteristics
211
into consideration. Retroactive Miller hearings will only need to
be conducted for a finite number of juveniles and will not allow
212
every sentenced juvenile to receive a reduced sentence.
D.

Juveniles Sentenced to LWOR: Deterrence v. Rehabilitation

This abstract discussion of retroactivity affects juveniles
213
spending the rest of their lives in prison. An estimated 2574
juveniles are currently sentenced to LWOR throughout the
214
country. When the district court resentenced Roman Nose to life
with the possibility of parole after thirty years, it did not consider
215
his individual characteristics. The court should have granted him
a Miller hearing in order to adhere to the United States Supreme
Court’s goal of rehabilitation in connection with juvenile
216
offenders.
Rehabilitation is a closely linked goal to the juvenile system
217
since children are categorically different from adults. The Court
in Roper, which prohibited the death penalty, relied on the fact that
“any parent” or expert would confirm that juveniles are different
218
from adults in three ways. First, they lack maturity, which lends
219
itself readily to making poor decisions. Second, children are
“more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside

211. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012).
212. See generally State-by-State Map, Graphic on Juveniles Serving Life Sentences
Without Parole in the U.S., PBS FRONTLINE (May 8, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map.html#more [hereinafter State-by-State
Map] (estimating that 2574 juveniles are sentenced to LWOR based on data from
Human Rights Watch as of 2009).
213. See Scott, supra note 162, at 179. See generally Beth Schwartzapfel, Sentenced
Young: The Story of Life Without Parole for Juveniles Offenders, AL JEZEERA AM.
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/features/2014/1/sentenced-young
-thestoryoflifewithoutparoleforjuvenileoffenders.html (profiling stories of juveniles
serving LWOR).
214. State-by-State Map, supra note 212.
215. Brief & Appendix of Appellant at 9, Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193
(Minn. 2014) (No. A13-0483) (stating that Roman Nose was resentenced without
holding a sentencing hearing).
216. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (remanding for a resentencing hearing).
217. See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 889–93.
218. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
219. Id.
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220

pressures.”
Third, and most important to the discussion of
rehabilitation, a juvenile’s character is not as well formed as an
221
adult’s. The Court also stressed rehabilitation when banning
juvenile LWOR for non-homicide crimes:
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to
that considered reflection which is the foundation for
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who
knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before
life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible
222
individual.
On the other hand, Justice Dietzen in Chambers emphasized
223
deterrence as a primary reason not to apply Miller retroactively,
despite the United States Supreme Court admitting that deterrence
224
does not justify an imposition of LWOR in non-homicide cases.
Juveniles lack the maturity and have an undeveloped sense of
responsibility, often resulting in “‘impetuous and ill-considered
225
actions and decisions.’” “The same characteristics that render
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be
226
less susceptible to deterrence.” In fact, “swiftness and certainty of
conviction, rather than sentence severity, is most relevant to
227
effective deterrence.” It is even suggested that people are more

220. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1984) (“[Y]outh is more
than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”)).
221. Id. at 570 (“The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed.”).
222. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
223. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 320, 323 (Minn. 2013) (“Application
of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final
seriously undermines the principle of finality . . . . Without finality, the criminal
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 309 (1989))).
224. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (“Deterrence does not suffice to justify the
sentence either.”).
225. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
226. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (2005)).
227. Russell, supra note 189, at 154 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 n.21
(1963)).
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deterred by a system that is viewed as just and legitimate than one
228
with harsher penalties.
Beyond the debate of whether the goal in sentencing juveniles
should be rehabilitation or deterrence, it is interesting to note that
state statutes have never explicitly endorsed the policy of
229
sentencing juveniles to LWOR.
Rather, it came about as a
230
“statutory accident.” In Graham, Justice Kennedy noted, “the
statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole
does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through
231
deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”
Since
LWOR for juveniles was imposed without any express
consideration, courts should take the time to reflect and come to
the conclusion that rehabilitation outweighs deterrence as a policy
goal for juveniles sentenced to LWOR. The Roman Nose and
Chambers decisions are contrary to that policy, and for the eight that
serve life for crimes committed as juveniles in Minnesota, the
retroactivity analysis should have allowed them the opportunity to
232
receive a Miller hearing.
E.

Forging a New Retroactivity Doctrine in Minnesota

The Minnesota Supreme Court should have applied a
modified Teague analysis to determine that Miller applies
233
retroactively. The court should follow Nevada’s lead in adopting
a broader retroactivity doctrine, which accounts for new rules that
234
This
do not fit into the substantive/procedural dichotomy.
flexibility would not force the court to make such rigid

228. Id. (citing Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 173, 176–77 (2008)) (suggesting that a high incarceration rate can undermine
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system).
229. NELLIS, supra note 195, at 28 (citing Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d
749, 766 (2012)).
230. Id.
231. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
232. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
233. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (“I would not adopt Teague in total, rather I would, as the Nevada
Supreme Court has done, adopt the basic approach set forth in Teague but with
some significant qualifications.”).
234. See id.; Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002).
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determinations in ambiguous circumstances, like in this case.
Nevada allowed itself the flexibility to retain the basic outline of the
Teague rule, while being able to make exceptions when it felt
236
necessary. Although this case note does not advocate adopting
the same rule, it is prudent to use the same principle in crafting a
237
retroactivity rule that works for Minnesota. The analysis the court
should use must take into account the purpose and effect of the
238
rule that is being addressed.
1.

The Guiding Principle of the Retroactivity Doctrine and Miller
Hearings

The United States Supreme Court limited retroactivity as an
administrative need because it is not possible to apply every new
239
decision retroactively to cases already finished. It needed to find a
cutoff line to determine which cases are worthy of receiving the
235. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 500 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The policy
interests of finality and uniformity addressed by Teague are important, but I
conclude that the Supreme Court has applied the Teague rule so narrowly and
strictly that many cases involving constitutional safeguards that warrant collateral
review have not or will not receive such review.”); see also Chambers v. State, 831
N.W.2d 311, 341 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
236. Colwell, 59 P.3d 463 at 471 (“[W]e are free to choose the degree of
retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule
under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as
broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.” (quoting State v.
Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972))).
237. Other jurisdictions have considered the defendant’s equal treatment as
an additional factor in the retroactivity analysis. See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y
for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 282 (Mass. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d
716, 728–29 (Neb. 2014) (citing State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa
2013)). A prior William Mitchell Law Review case note argued for the adoption of
the modified Nevada approach when the Supreme Court held that Teague is not
binding on the states. Zorislav R. Leyderman, Note, Criminal Law: Minnesota
Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity Standard for State Post-Conviction Proceedings—
Danforth v. State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 321 (2009). Although this is a
well-reasoned alternative, it did not contemplate cases where a new rule of
criminal procedure is not clearly substantive or procedural. See id. The analysis
suggested in this case note addresses this issue. See supra Part IV.A.
238. South Dakota’s rule also takes into account the purpose of the rule in
adopting a modified Linkletter approach. Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517
(S.D. 1990).
239. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273 (2008) (citing Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)).
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240

benefit of a retroactive rule. The guiding principle that the Court
used in Teague is to determine if a new rule of criminal procedure
241
changes our view on whether a person is considered guilty.
If a new rule is substantive, it typically does one of three things.
First, a substantive rule “prohibit[s] a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
242
offense.” Second, a substantive rule “alters the range of conduct
243
or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Third, a substantive
rule “narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
244
terms.” Each of these changes the view of whether a convicted
245
person is still considered guilty. A substantive rule “necessarily
carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an
246
act that the law does not make criminal.”
Alternatively, a
procedural criminal rule only addresses the process of how
someone’s guilt is determined, not whether the person in question
247
is still considered culpable. As Justice Scalia pointed out, it is
more speculative whether a person is still considered culpable
248
when the new rule is procedural.
The purpose of the retroactivity doctrine turns on whether a
249
rule will continue to define someone as criminally culpable. In
the administration of the court, a rule should apply to defendants
whose cases are long since closed only when it changes whether
250
they are considered criminally culpable. However, when the
240. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627–30.
241. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).
242. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated by Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
243. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.
244. Id. at 351.
245. Id. at 352.
246. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 352. This is a slight oversimplification of the rule, ignoring the
bedrock procedural rule exception. Id. (giving retroactive effect in “only a small
set of ‘watershed rules . . .’” (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990))).
The underlying principle in the second exception is the implication of
“‘fundamental fairness and accuracy,’” which is tangential to this discussion. Id.
(quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495).
250. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989) (agreeing with Justice
Harlan’s previous concurrences and dissents that retroactivity should be reserved

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/12

30

Mazurek: Criminal Law: No Looking Back: Narrowing the Scope of the Retroac

360

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

United States Supreme Court devised the substantive/procedural
analysis to accomplish this goal, it divorced itself from the
underlying principle guiding the distinction created in the
251
retroactivity rule. Instead, courts focus on this extremely abstract,
often arbitrary, analysis contemplating if a rule is substantive or
252
procedural.
Miller is guided by the same basic principle—to protect a
group of people categorically distinguished as less criminally
253
culpable. In the very special circumstance of sentencing juveniles
to our nation’s second, and Minnesota’s first, harshest punishment,
254
Miller commands a sentencing court to determine culpability. It
guides the determination of whether a juvenile is in fact culpable
for the crime that they committed, or whether they lack the
255
maturity, understanding, and foresight to be criminally liable. If
they are not as criminally liable for their actions, Miller implies they
256
should not be sentenced to LWOR.
2.

Minnesota Fails to Recognize the Underlying Principle of
Specialized Considerations for the Less Culpable in Not Applying
Miller Retroactively

The guiding principle of both prohibiting mandatory LWOR
and determining retroactivity is actually the same: people deemed

for limited, worthy cases).
251. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (defining the distinction the Court uses in its
retroactivity analysis in terms of substance versus procedure and shifting the
analysis away from the language in Teague).
252. Id.
253. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457, 2464 (2012) (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 571 (2005)) (recognizing that juveniles have diminished
culpability).
254. Id. at 2469; see also MINN. STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2 (2012) (LWOR is
Minnesota’s harshest penalty); John D. Bessler, The “Midnight Assassination Law”
and Minnesota’s Anti-Death Penalty Movement, 1849–1911, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
577, 690 (1996) (reviewing the history of Minnesota’s 1911 abolition of the death
penalty).
255. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
256. Id. (“‘A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,’ but must
provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50
(2010))).
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less criminally culpable should receive extra consideration. In the
case of retroactivity, the court applies a rule retroactively if the
convicted is no longer considered as criminally liable, despite the
258
case being concluded. In the case of juveniles sentenced to
LWOR, the court must decide whether they are too immature to be
259
criminally liable.
But, Minnesota’s driving goal in adopting
260
Teague was finality and evenhandedness.
The United States Supreme Court abandoned Linkletter and
261
devised a new rule so that retroactivity is uniformly applied. But,
uniformity was not the reason why the Court chose to create the
substantive/procedural dichotomy specifically for rules of
262
constitutional criminal procedure.
As stated above, the
substantive/procedural analysis is used to determine whether the
263
change in the rule negates the culpability of the convicted. In
adopting Teague and ignoring the underlying goal of determining
retroactivity, the Minnesota Supreme Court and other courts are
264
blinded by the strict application of the retroactivity rule. Courts
get bogged down in the abstract idea of substance versus
265
266
procedure. The guiding principle is lost in its application.
257. Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (providing an additional
hearing at sentencing to determine a juvenile’s culpability before handing down a
LWOR sentence), with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (providing
retroactivity to defendants when federal law substantively changes).
258. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).
259. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
260. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 497–99 (Minn. 2009).
261. Teague, 489 U.S. at 302.
262. The court adopted the new dividing line based on the concurrences and
dissents of Justice Harlan. See id. (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256–
57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
263. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
264. See Berman, supra note 189, at 166 (“Consequently, it is now critically
important for policy-makers, courts, and scholars to consider more thoughtfully
and thoroughly the values and interests served—and not served—by doctrines,
policies, and practices that may allow or preclude the review of sentences after
they have been deemed final.”).
265. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326–30 (Minn. 2013). But see
Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 203 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., concurring)
(acknowledging both the substantive and procedural characteristics of Miller).
266. See Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002) (“Though we consider
the approach to retroactivity set forth in Teague to be sound principle, the
Supreme Court has applied it so strictly in practice that decisions defining a
constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.”); Cowell v.
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Minnesota fails to recognize that the retroactivity doctrine is used
to determine whether a rule has the power to change someone’s
267
culpability. Similarly, Minnesota’s analysis fails to recognize that
the rule announced in Miller is used to determine whether a
juvenile is considered sufficiently criminally liable to impose
268
LWOR. Minnesota should employ a retroactivity rule that allows
it to recognize both of these underlying considerations without
269
getting stuck in the strict substantive/procedural dichotomy.
3.

New Rule: Consider the Underlying Principle in Ambiguous Cases

This case note is not advocating for a rule that markedly
broadens the retroactivity doctrine, but for one that clarifies the
analysis. In order to accomplish this, the court should adopt a
modified Teague analysis, like Nevada did, which takes into account
an additional consideration when a new rule is not clearly
270
substantive or procedural. Minnesota should explicitly consider
whether the rule, as applied, would change the culpability of those
271
seeking retroactive application.
The proposed rule is administrable, encourages uniform
272
results, and provides meaningful relief for those who deserve it.
The traditional Teague analysis should still apply in cases when the
rule being reviewed is clearly substantive or procedural. It is not
necessary to delve into a second layer of analysis if a new rule is
clearly substantive or procedural. But, in ambiguous cases, a second
analysis should be triggered. A simple question can be employed:
would applying this rule to the defendant have the likelihood to

Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 518 (S.D. 1990) (“We find the Teague rule to be unduly
narrow as to what issues it will consider on collateral review.”).
267. See Schriro, 542 U.S at 352.
268. See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 201; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 325–27.
269. See Berman, supra note 189, at 151.
270. See Colwell, 59 P.3d at 471.
271. See id. Nevada’s modified Teague analysis is not described in these exact
terms, but it is based in the principle that it may give broader relief when it sees fit.
Id.
272. Since Miller does not fit into the substantive/procedural dichotomy,
courts decide whether to deem it substantive or procedural. See Songster v. Beard,
No. 04-5916, 2014 WL 3731459, at *3 (D. Pa., July 29, 2014). The extra
consideration creates a marker for courts to use to disentangle the ambiguity of
the rule while making a fair determination on the individual case. Id.
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reasonably negate whether the defendant is considered guilty? If
the answer is yes, the rule should apply retroactively; if the answer is
no, the rule is not worth applying retroactively. In the case of Miller,
274
the answer is yes. If a juvenile is found to lack the maturity,
forethought, and ability to understand the gravity of a decision
after a Miller hearing, he or she will not be considered criminally
275
culpable enough to be sentenced to LWOR.
4.

Roman Nose

In this case, Roman Nose committed a horrendous crime, and
276
nothing can make up for that fact. This case note does not
advocate for Roman Nose’s release from prison, or even that he
should receive a reduced sentence. As a juvenile sentenced to
LWOR, however, the Eighth Amendment entitles him to one
hearing to consider his culpability as a juvenile convicted of
277
murder. Constitutional rights should not be withheld arbitrarily
because the analysis is ambiguous.
It is likely that the day may never come when Roman Nose
receives a reduced sentence, but the guiding principle of the
retroactivity doctrine dictates that he at least be given the

273. It is not the same determination as to whether the process used to find
guilt was accurate. It is not an evidentiary determination, but a determination of
what is understood as guilt. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)
(explaining that procedural rules “merely raise the possibility that someone
convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted
otherwise”). See generally Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168 (1996) (holding
that a new rule requiring adequate notice of evidence to be used at the penalty
hearing of a capital murder trial was procedural).
274. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013).
There is a strong argument that Miller should apply retroactively: It
says that it is beyond the authority of the criminal law to impose a
mandatory sentence of life without parole. It would be terribly unfair
to have individuals imprisoned for life without any chance of parole
based on the accident of the timing of the trial.
Id. (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means
Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012,
8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/Chemerinsky_juvenile_life
-without-parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/).
275. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
276. See Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d 386, 389–90 (Minn. 2003).
277. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
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opportunity. Again, this would not allow every child sentenced to
278
LWOR to receive a reduced sentence. For some children—as sad
as it is to admit—there is no saving, and there is nowhere else to
place them. They will need to live and die behind bars because of
the threat they pose to society. The Supreme Court has likened
279
LWOR to a death sentence for juveniles.
Applying Miller
retroactively would not create black letter law mandating all
280
juveniles sentenced to LWOR receive new sentences. It would
281
only give relief to those who deserve it.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s second application of Miller
in Roman Nose gave the court the opportunity to reflect on its
Chambers decision. The court again affirmed a rule meant to create
a bright line on retroactivity, but—as shown all around the
country—it has created disparate results for juveniles sentenced to
282
LWOR. The underlying goals of both the retroactivity doctrine
and the rule pronounced in Miller are similar, and Minnesota’s
retroactivity doctrine should be flexible enough to take this into
consideration. However, the differing interpretations among the
283
states and the way they have addressed the issue suggest that the
278. Id. at 2474–75.
279. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 332 (Minn. 2013) (citing Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466–67 (2012)) (“The Supreme Court has held that
[LWOR] is tantamount to a death sentence for an offender who . . . is sentenced
for a crime committed when he was a juvenile.”).
280. Id. at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (explaining that a remand for a
Miller sentencing hearing “does not in and of itself change the life-in-prisonwithout-release aspect of [a petitioner’s] sentence,” but allows him or her the
opportunity to have a hearing).
281. See id.
282. For further discussion of the cultural aspects of juveniles sentenced to
LWOR, see NELLIS supra note 195.
283. Some states have chosen to address the issue legislatively. Compare CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw through ch. 931 of 2014 Leg.
Sess.) (allowing petition after fifteen years), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4204A(d)(1)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after
thirty years), and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after thirty-five years), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 610-301(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after twentyfive years), with H.F. 3358, 88th Leg. Sess. (Minn.) (as introduced to House on
Apr. 28, 2014) (prohibiting LWOR petitions).
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United States Supreme Court should ultimately decide whether
284
Miller applies retroactively. Until that happens, Minnesota should
adopt a modified Teague analysis, allowing it to take into
consideration the underlying principle of the newly announced
rule in ambiguous cases.

284. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn. 2014) (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring) (“One can only hope that the United States Supreme Court will take
its earliest opportunity to clarify whether [Miller] applies retroactively.”).
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